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Abstract We consider the problem of how to optimally close a large asset
position in a market with a linear temporary price impact. We take the per-
spective of an agent who obtains a signal about the future price evolvement.
By means of classical stochastic control we derive explicit formulas for the clos-
ing strategy that minimizes the expected execution costs. We compare agents
observing the signal with agents who do not see it. We compute explicitly the
expected additional gain due to the signal, and perform a comparative statics
analysis.
Introduction
For many companies it is part of day-to-day business to build up and close
large asset positions on financial markets. For example, whenever a fund mod-
ifies its investment strategy, it will reduce the position of some of its assets,
while enlarging the holdings of other ones. Energy companies have to unwind
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long positions of power and buy the commodities they need for the power
generation.
Selling or buying a large amount of an asset in short time usually entails
a price impact. This is why in practice financial institutions, from now on
referred to as agents, frequently unwind large positions by splitting them into
smaller parts and closing them successively. Spreading orders over time implies
the price impact to be smaller.
Agents closing a large asset position sometimes have additional informa-
tion about the future price. The extra information can be based for example
on assessments of market analysts. Trading houses have teams of analysts con-
stantly observing markets. The analysts provide market assessments or even
forecasts that are incorporated in the company’s trading decisions.
The main aim of the paper is to study the value of a market assessment
before it is revealed. To put it differently, we look at the expected additional
value of market expertise. To this end we introduce into our model an expert
who obtains a signal about the asset price at time T , the time up to which the
position has to be closed. If the expert passes the knowledge on to the agent
having to close the position, then we say that the agent is informed; else she
is non-informed. We use the technique of filtration enlargements for modeling
the information flow of the informed agent.
By comparing the optimal execution strategy of a non-informed agent with
the one of an informed agent, one can derive the additional gain due to the
signal. In order to obtain a closed form formula for the additional gain, we
work in a stylized model. We assume that the price signal is the asset price at
T disturbed by an independent centered Gaussian noise. Morever, we suppose
that any transaction has a linear absolute temporary (abbreviated by LAT in
the pioneering paper [7]) impact on the asset’s price. The fundamental (i.e.
non-influenced) price process is assumed to be a Brownian motion, comple-
mented by a drift. We suppose that the agent aims at maximizing the expected
proceeds (resp. minimizing expected costs) from closing a position.
We characterize optimal closing strategies by using standard stochastic
control methods. The simple model set-up allows to obtain explicit formulas
for the value functions and the optimal controls, and hence for the expected
additional gain due to the signal.
We find that the expected additional gain due to the signal does not de-
pendent on the initial price and on the agent’s initial position size. The gain
from the signal is only determined by three factors, namely the signal’s noise,
the volatility and the liquidity of the asset. We perform a comparative statics
analysis of the additional gain to distill the precise dependence on these three
factors.
We consider also the case where the signal reveals the asset’s exact funda-
mental price at T , i.e. where the signal is not distorted by noise. We show that
in this case the additional gain is finite. The market would admit arbitrage
if there were no market frictions. The price impact entailed by any trading
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implies that the gain from exactly knowing the fundamental price at a future
date is only finite.
The value of a price signal has so far been studied mainly within utility
maximization models. In [13] the authors calculate, also by employing filtration
enlargements, the expected additional logarithmic utility of an investor pos-
sessing inside information. They do not consider market frictions and hence
obtain that the additional utility is infinite if the exact asset’s price at T
is known to the investor. The model of [13] has been put forward in many
succeeding papers, e.g. in [2], [4], [5].
As an auxiliary step in the calculation of the additional gain we compute
first the signal’s a posteriori value. After receiving the signal, the agent per-
ceives the price dynamics with an additional linear drift. Therefore, we shortly
discuss also the liquidation problem under directional views. In Section 1 we
summarize findings on optimal liquidation in a Bachelier model with a linear
drift.
So far the liquidation literature has only briefly analyzed the impact of
market opinions on trading strategies. Almgren & Chriss [1] calculate opti-
mal deterministic liquidation strategies, allowing for directional views. They
assume that the agent’s objective is to minimize a weighted sum of the mean
and the variance of the proceeds. It is remarkable that the optimal strategy
from [1] maximizes CARA utility - not only among all deterministic, but even
among all predictable trajectories. This is shown in [16] for a time continuous
version of the Almgren & Chriss model. The paper [15] also studies the influ-
ence of price drifts on optimal liquidation strategies. A general semimartingale
perspective is taken, leading to a more abstract representation of liquidation
strategies in terms of conditional expectations.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 1 we set up the model frame-
work and provide optimal position strategies within a Bachelier-type model
with a linear price drift. In Section 2, we estimate the value of additional infor-
mation from an agent’s perspective before the information is revealed. Section
3 performs a comparative statics analysis.
1 Closing positions in a Bachelier model with drift
1.1 The model set-up
Consider an agent who has to unwind a position of X0 ∈ R shares of an asset
until a time horizon T > 0. We assume that the fundamental asset price is a
drifted Brownian motion satisfying the SDE
dSt = a(t, St)dt+ σdWt,
where σ > 0 is a constant volatility, a : [0, T ]×R→ R a measurable drift func-
tion andW a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ht)t∈[0,T ],P).
We assume that there exists C ∈ R+ such that |a(t, s)| ≤ C(1 + s) for all
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t ∈ [0, T ] and s ∈ R+. We interpret the drift as the agent’s directional view or
extra information about the future price evolution. Moreover, we assume that
all prices are forward prices so that no discounting is needed. The filtration H
represents the agent’s information.
A closing strategy (or simply strategy) of a position x ∈ R at time t ∈ [0, T )
is a (Ht)-predictable strategy ξ = (ξu) satisfying
∫ T
t
ξudu = x. We interpret
ξt as the selling rate at time t ∈ [0, T ]. Given ξ, the total position at time
t ∈ [0, T ] is given by
Xt = X0 −
∫ t
0
ξsds.
Notice that XT = 0, i.e. the position is closed at T .
For technical reasons we impose the following integrability condition on the
closing strategies: a strategy (ξu), resp. its associated position process (Xt), is
called admissible if
(A1) the process ξ is L2-integrable, i.e E(
∫ T
0
ξ2udu) <∞,
(A2) the family
((
X∗t
T−t
)2)
0≤t≤T
is uniformly integrable,
and limt→T
X2t
T−t = 0, a.s.
We denote by AH(t, x) the set of all admissible closing strategies of x at t.
We suppose that any transaction entails a price impact that is linear with
respect to the selling rate. Moreover, the impact is assumed to be absolute and
only instantaneous. Selling at a rate of ξt is thus possible only at the realized
price of
S˜t = St − ηξt,
where η > 0 is the price impact parameter.
The final revenues (possibly negative) of the liquidation operation when
selling at a rate (ξt)t∈[0,T ] are given by
RT =
∫ T
0
ξuS˜udu.
Notice that by the product formula we have
RT =
∫ T
0
ξuSudu− η
∫ T
0
ξ2udu
= X0S0 +
∫ T
0
Xua(u, Su)du+
∫ T
0
XuσdWu − η
∫ T
0
ξ2udu. (1)
Assumption (A2) guarantees that a position process X, associated to an ad-
missible strategy ξ, is square integrable, and thus taking expectations in (1)
we get
E(RT ) = X0S0 + E
∫ T
0
(Xua(u, Su)− ηξ2u)du.
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We assume that the agent aims at maximizing the expected value of the final
revenues. More precisely the target function is given by
J(t, x, s, ξ) = E
[∫ T
t
(
Xua(u, Su)− ηξ2u
)
du
∣∣∣∣∣Xt = x, St = s
]
,
for (t, x, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R. The value function is defined by
V (t, x, s) = sup
ξ∈AH(t,x)
J(t, x, s, ξ). (2)
Notice that the value function can be interpreted as expected execution costs.
Remark 1 If the impact of the liquidation operation on the price dynamics is
not only instantaneous, but lasts in the considered period, one can add to the
model a so-called perpetual impact factor, depending on the total amount of
the position closed up to time t. The form of the realized price dynamics is
then
S˜t = St − ηt − c(X0 −Xt),
where c is the permanent impact factor.
The final revenues in this case are given by
RT = X0S0 +
1
2
cX20 +
∫ T
0
Xua(u, Su)du+
∫ T
0
XuσdWu − η
∫ T
0
ξ2udu. (3)
The only difference with Equation (1) is the constant term 12cX
2
0 , which does
not influence the optimization. From a mathematical point of view the problem
is identical.
1.2 Optimal closure for linear price drifts
If the price drift coefficient is linear, then the value function turns out to be
a quadratic form of both the position size and the price. One can determine
the value function and the optimal position process in closed form by using
classical stochastic control techniques.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation associated to the control problem
(2) is given by
−Vt − a(t, s)Vs − 1
2
σ2Vss − a(t, s)x− sup
ξ∈R
[−ξVx − ηξ2] = 0, (4)
with the singular terminal condition
lim
t↑T
V (t, x, s) =
{
0, if x = 0,
−∞, if x 6= 0. (5)
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The first order condition implies that the supremum on the left hand side of
(4) is attained by ξ∗ = −Vx2η . We obtain a simplified HJB equation
−Vt − a(t, s)Vs − 1
2
σ2Vss − a(t, s)x− V
2
x
4η
= 0. (6)
From now on, we suppose that the price drift coefficient is an affine linear
function of the form
a(t, s) = α(t) + β(t)s,
where α and β are functions on [0, T ]. Notice that this implies
St = h(0, t)S0 +
∫ t
0
h(r, t)α(r)dr +
∫ t
0
h(r, t)σdWr,
where h(r, t) = e
∫ t
r
β(s)ds. Moreover, the value function is a quadratic function
of the price and the remaining position, as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Assume that a(t, s) = α(t) + β(t)s, where α and β are bounded.
Then the value function satisfies
V (t, x, s) = b(t)x2 + c(t)xs+ d(t)s2 + e(t)x+ f(t)s+ g(t), (7)
where b, c, d, e, f and g are deterministic functions with explicit expressions
provided in the appendix. The optimal position trajectory is given by
X∗t =
T − t
T
(
X0 +
1
2η
∫ t
0
[c(u)Su + e(u)]
T
T − udu
)
. (8)
Theorem 1.2 can be derived from results in [15]. Nevertheless, we present
in the appendix a simple, direct and self-contained proof, based on classical
verifications arguments (in contrast to variational arguments used in [15]).
2 Informed and non-informed agents
Suppose that there is an expert, e.g. a market analyst or an insider, who has
obtained a signal about the asset price at time T . In this section we aim at
quantifying the value of the signal from the perspective of the agent having to
close the asset position.
For simplicity we suppose in the following that the price process is a Brow-
nian motion without drift; more precisely St = σWt. This means that S is a
martingale with respect to (FWt ), the filtration generated by W .
We model the signal as a random variable G = ST +N , where N is inde-
pendent of the price process and normally distributed with mean zero. Since G
is Gaussian, it is equivalent to the signal sent from a price ST ′ , where T
′ ≥ T .
One can interpret the difference σ2(T ′−T ) as the variance of the signal’s noise.
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If the expert discloses the signal to the agent, then we say that the agent
is informed. In this case the agent’s information flow can be modeled as the
following initial enlargement of the Brownian filtration:
Gt = FWt ∨ σ(ST ′), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
In case the expert does not pass on the signal, we say that the agent is non-
informed. The information flow of the agent is then represented by the natural
filtration (FWt ). The value function of the informed agent, conditional to ST ′ ,
is given by
V I(t, x, s) = sup
ξ∈AG(t,x)
E
[∫ T
t
(
Xua(u, Su)− ηξ2u
)
du
∣∣∣∣∣Xt = x, St = s, ST ′
]
,(9)
and the value function of the non-informed agent by
V N (t, x, s) = sup
ξ∈AF (t,x)
J(t, x, s, ξ). (10)
2.1 A priori and posteriori signal value
One can show that the price dynamics under (Gt) satisfy
dSt = σdW
G
t + σ
ST ′ − St
T ′ − t dt, (11)
where WG is a Brownian motion with respect to (Gt) (see e.g. [14]). The drift in
the (Gt)-dynamics (11) is linear with α(t) = S
′
T
T ′−t and β(t) = − 1T ′−t . If T ′ > T ,
then α and β are bounded. To put it differently: once the signal is revealed, the
informed agent perceives the price with a linear drift satisfying the assumptions
of Subsection 1.2. Therefore, we can use Theorem 1 to calculate, conditional
to ST ′ , the a posteriori expected execution costs. The a priori costs are given
as the expectation of the a posteriori costs.
The next theorem provides the value functions in closed form for both the
informed and non-informed agent.
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Theorem 2 Let T ′ > T . The value function of the informed agent is a
quadratic function as in (7) with coefficients
bI(t) = −η 1
T − t
cI(t) = −1
2
T − t
T ′ − t
dI(t) =
1
48η
(T − t)3
(T ′ − t)2
eI(t) =
1
2
T − t
T ′ − tST ′
f I(t) =
1
η
ST ′
T ′ − t
(
1
8
(T ′ − T )(T − t)− 1
24
(T ′ − t)2 + 1
24
(T ′ − T )3
T ′ − t
)
gI(t) =
S2T ′
η
(
1
12
(T ′ − T )− 1
16
(T ′ − T )2
T ′ − t
)
−S
2
T ′
η
(
1
8
(T ′ − T ) T − t
T ′ − t −
1
24
(T − t)− 1
48
(T ′ − T )3
(T ′ − t)2
)
+
σ2
48η
(
(T ′ − T )3
T ′ − t −
3
2
(T ′ − T )2 + 3(T ′ − T )2 ln
(
T ′ − t
T ′ − T
))
+
σ2
48η
(
−3(T ′ − T )(T − t) + 1
2
(T ′ − t)2
)
.
The value function for the non-informed agent is given by V N (0, x, s) = −η x2T .
Proof The result follows from Theorem 1 and straightforward calculations.
2.2 The expected additional gain
We define the difference E
[
V I(0, s, x)
]−V N (0, s, x) as the expected additional
gain of the agent having access to the signal. The next result provides an
explicit formula for additional gain.
Theorem 3 Let T ′ > T . The expected additional gain is given by
E
[
V I(0, s, x)− V N (0, s, x)] = σ2
16η
(
(T ′ − T )2 ln
(
T ′
T ′ − T
)
− TT ′ + 3
2
T 2
)
.(12)
The additional gain does not depend on the size of the initial position x.
This is because a priori the direction of the signal is not clear. The signal can
entail a positive or a negative drift. If the agent has a long position in the
asset, then a negative drift entails lower expected revenues and a positive drift
yields higher expected revenues. In average, this effect cancels out so that the
expected additional gain from the signal is independent of the position size.
Observe further that the additional value does also not depend on the price
level s. The reason is that in the underlying Bachelier model the size of the
price increments do not depend on the starting price.
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In the following we denote the expected additional gain by ∆(T, T ′) =
E
[
V I(0, s, x)− V N (0, s, x)]. Sometimes we write ∆(T, T ′, σ, η) in order to
stress its dependence on σ and η.
The following lemma will be necessary to prove Theorem 3.
Lemma 1
E
[(∫ t
0
WT −Wu
T − u du
)2]
= 2t(1 + ln(T ))− 2T ln(T ) + 2(T − t) ln(T − t)(13)
Proof The product formula applied to the (Gt)-semimartingales Xt = ln(T−t)
and Yt = WT −Wt, t ∈ [0, T ), implies
−
∫ t
0
WT −Wu
T − u du = ln(T − t)(WT −Wt)− ln(T )WT −
∫ t
0
ln(T − u)dWu,(14)
and hence
E
[(∫ t
0
WT −Wu
T − u du
)2]
= ln2(T − t)(T − t) + ln2(T )T 2 +
∫ t
0
ln2(T − u)du
−2 ln(T − t) ln(T )(T − t)− 2 ln(T )
∫ t
0
ln(T − u)du.
A straightforward simplification of the integrals leads to Equation (13).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3) By Theorem 1 the optimal strategy of the in-
formed agent satisfies
ξ∗t =
X∗t
T − t −
1
4η
T − t
T ′ − t (ST ′ − St),
and the optimal position trajectory is given by
X∗t =
T − t
T
(
x+
1
4η
T
∫ t
0
ST ′ − Su
T ′ − u du
)
.
The martingale property of the price process implies that the value function
satisfies
V I(0, x, s) (15)
= −ηx
2
T
+ E
∫ T
0
[
3
2
X∗t
ST ′ − St
T ′ − t −
1
16η
(∫ t
0
ST ′ − Su
T ′ − u du
)2
− 1
16η
(T − t)2
(T ′ − t)2 (ST ′ − St)
2
]
dt
Observe that
E(X∗t (ST ′ − St)) = (T − t)
1
4η
E
[
(ST ′ − St)
∫ t
0
ST ′ − Su
T ′ − u du
]
= (T − t) 1
4η
∫ t
0
E [(ST ′ − St) ((ST ′ − St) + (St − Su))]
T ′ − u du
=
σ2
4η
(T − t)(T ′ − t) ln( T
′
T ′ − t ). (16)
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Moreover, by Lemma 1,
E
[(∫ t
0
ST ′ − Su
T ′ − u du
)2]
= σ2[2t(1 + ln(T ′))− 2T ′ ln(T ′) + 2(T ′ − t) ln(T ′ − t)].(17)
Combining Equation (16) and (17) with (15) yields
E[V I(0, x, s)] = −ηx
2
T
+
3σ2
8η
∫ T
0
(T − t) ln( T
′
T ′ − t )dt
−σ
2
8η
∫ T
0
[t(1 + ln(T ′))− T ′ ln(T ′) + (T ′ − t) ln(T ′ − t)]dt
− σ
2
16η
∫ T
0
(T − t)2
(T ′ − t) dt. (18)
Notice that∫ T
0
(T − t) ln(T ′ − t)dt = 1
2
(T ′ − T )2 ln(T ′ − T ) + TT ′ ln(T ′)− 1
2
(T ′)2 ln(T ′)
+
1
2
TT ′ − 3
4
T 2
and ∫ T
0
(T ′ − t) ln(T ′ − t)dt = −1
2
(T ′ − T )2 ln(T ′ − T ) + 1
4
(T ′ − T )2
+
1
2
(T ′)2 ln(T ′)− 1
4
(T ′)2
and∫ T
0
(T − t)2
(T ′ − t) dt = (T
′ − T )2 ln
(
T ′
T ′ − T
)
− 2(T ′ − T )T + TT ′ − 1
2
T 2.
A straightforward calculation shows that (18) simplifies to
E[V I(0, x, s)] = −ηx
2
T
+
σ2
16
(
(T ′ − T )2 ln
(
T ′
T ′ − T
)
− TT ′ + 3
2
T 2
)
.
Remark 2 One can alternatively calculate the additional utility by computing
the expectation of the coefficients eI(0), f I(0) and gI(0). By simplifying terms
one obtains again formula (12).
The expected additional gain ∆(T, T ′) converges to a finite value as T ′ ↓ T .
If T = T ′, then the market would admit arbitrage if there was no price impact.
It has been shown that an informed investor can achieve infinite expected
utility in a frictionless market (see e.g. [13] and [10]). In our model, in contrast,
the price impact excludes arbitrage and implies that the expected additional
gain doesn’t become infinite when T ′ is equal to T .
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Notice that if we choose T ′ = T , then the drift in the (Gt)-price dynamics
(11) is not bounded, and hence the assumptions of Theorem 1 are technically
not satisfied. Nevertheless, one can show that the result applies also to this
particular case. To this end one needs to make sure that the candidate for the
optimal control is admissible.
Proposition 1 Suppose that T ′ = T . Then the expected additional gain of the
informed agent is given by
E[V I(0, s, x)− V N (0, s, x)] = σ
2
32η
T 2. (19)
The optimal strategy is admissible and the associated position process satisfies
X∗t =
T−t
T
(
x+ 14ηT
∫ t
0
ST−Su
T−u du
)
.
Proof The first expression is obtained by taking the limit in ∆(T, T ′) as T ′ ↓ T .
To prove the admissibility, notice first that using Equation (14) for any p > 2,
there exists Cp such that
E
(
|
∫ t
0
ST − Su
T − u |
p
)
≤ Cp
lnp(T − t)(T − t)p/2 + lnp(T )T p/2 +
(∫ T
0
ln2(T − u)du
)p/2
This shows that
(∫ t
0
ST−Su
T−u du
)2
is uniformly integrable. We further obtain
that
(
X∗t
T−t
)2
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is uniformly integrable and limt→T X
∗
t
2
T−t = 0, a.s.
Moreover the process ξ∗ is squared integrable.
3 Comparative Statics
We next analyze the impact of the model parameters on the additional gain.
We start with the dependence on the signal quality.
3.1 Sensitivity with respect to the signal noise
If the noise of the signal increases, then the additional revenues of the informed
agent decrease. This is indeed confirmed by the next result.
Lemma 2 The expected revenues from additional information decrease as T ′
increases, i.e. the mapping f(x) = (x−T )2 ln
(
x
x−T
)
−Tx+ 32T 2 is decreasing
on [T,∞). Moreover, f(T ) = 12T 2 and limx→∞ f(x) = 0.
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Proof Notice that f ′(x) = 2(x− T ) ln
(
x
x−T
)
+ T
2
x − 2T and
f ′′(x) = −2 ln
(
1− T
x
)
− 2T
x
− T
2
x2
.
Since the logarithm is analytic on the open interval (0, 2), we further have for
x > T
f ′′(x) = 2
(
T
x
+
1
2
T 2
x2
+
1
3
T 3
x3
+ · · ·
)
− 2T
x
− T
2
x2
=
(
1
3
T 3
x3
+ · · ·
)
≥ 0.
Consequently f ′ is increasing on [T,∞). Besides observe that f ′(T ) = −T ,
and
lim
x→∞ f
′(x) = 2(x− T )
(
T
x
+
1
2
T 2
x2
+
1
3
T 3
x3
+ · · ·
)
− 2T
x
− T
2
x2
= 0,
which, together with the monotonicity of f ′, implies f ′ ≤ 0 on [T,∞). The
function f , therefore, is decreasing in x.
3.2 Sensitivity with respect to the time horizon
The additional gain increases when the time horizon T increases, while T ′
stays constant. Indeed, a straightforward computation shows that
∂2∆
∂T 2
= 2 ln
(
T ′
T ′ − T
)
≥ 0 for all T ∈ [0, T ′].
Hence the first derivative is increasing. Since ∂∆∂T (0, T
′) = 0, the first derivative
is non-negative and hence ∆ is increasing in T .
The increase in expected revenues has three reasons: first the signal be-
comes more valuable as the difference between T and T ′ decreases (informa-
tion effect); second there is more time for spreading orders over time and
hence one can reduce trading costs (liquidity effect); finally the variance of
the price over the trading period increases (variance effect).
We next aim at analyzing the three effects separately. The additional rev-
enues depend linearly on the volatility squared. We can thus eliminate the
variance effect by making σ2 inversely proportional to T . We define the vari-
ance corrected gain by
l(T, x) = ∆(T, x, σ/
√
T , η) =
σ2
16η
(
(x− T )2
T
ln
(
x
x− T
)
− x+ 3
2
T
)
,
for 0 ≤ T ≤ x.
We next aim at analyzing the part of revenue increase that goes back to the
liquidity effect. To this end we simultaneously change T and T ′ such that the
information content of the signal remains the same. We appeal to the notion
of mutual information for measuring the information content of the signal.
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Recall that the mutual information between two normally distributed ran-
dom variables X and Y is given by I(X,Y ) = − 12 ln(1− corr2(X,Y )) (see e.g.
[12]). In particular, for any δ > 0 we have I(ST , ST+δ) =
1
2 ln
(
T+δ
T
)
.
For γ > 0 the mutual information I(ST , S(γ+1)T ) =
1
2 ln (1 + γ) does not
depend on the time horizon T . We can thus interpret
h(T ) = l(T, (1 + γ)T )
as a variance and information (v&i) corrected gain function. The next proposi-
tion shows that the v&i corrected gain increases as the time horizon increases.
The reason is that the additional time for trading allows to reduce liquidity
costs and to make more use of the information advantage.
Proposition 2 (The liquidity effect) Let γ > 0. The v&i corrected gain
function h is linear, increasing and satisfies h(0) = 0.
Proof Note that
16η
σ2
h(T ) = γ2T ln
(
1 + γ
γ
)
− γT + 1
2
T
=
[
γ2
(
1
γ
− 1
2
1
γ2
+
1
3
1
γ3
− 1
4
1
γ4
+ · · ·
)
− γ + 1
2
]
T
= γ2
(
1
3
1
γ3
− 1
4
1
γ4
+ · · ·
)
T,
which shows that h is non-negative and linearly increasing in T .
Finally we turn to the information effect. By scaling the volatility with 1/
√
T
and the price impact parameter with T , we obtain a variance and liquidity
(v&l) corrected gain function
k(y) = ∆(y, T ′, σ/
√
y, ηy),
defined for all y ∈ [0, T ′]. The function k describes the gain that exclusively
goes back to the additional information, as T approaches T ′. It is, as expected,
increasing:
Proposition 3 (The information effect) The v&l corrected gain function
k increases superlinearly on [0, T ′] and satisfies limx↑T ′ k(x) = 12
σ2
16η .
Proof k′′(x) = 2T ′ 3T
′−2x
x4 ln(
T ′
T ′−x )− 6T
′
x3 +
1
x2 is positive and k
′(0) ≤ 0, which
implies the first statement. The second is straightforward to show.
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Conclusion
The paper studies the optimal liquidation problem under additional informa-
tion. The kind of additional information chosen here is modeled via an initial
enlargement of filtration, sometimes referred to as strong initial information
(see for example [3], [10], or [9] for an introduction into the subject. See also [11]
and [6] for a presentation of other types of additional information). Since the
price dynamics under the enlargement have a drift that is linear with respect to
the price, we obtain the optimal liquidation strategy in closed form. For any
kind of additional information resp. filtration enlargement under which the
drift is linear, one can derive explicitly the additional gain by using Theorem
1. For example the additional information studied in the paper of Corcuera
et al. [8] (strong noisy information, represented by a signal plus a decreasing
noise) leads to a linear drift, and hence fits to our model.
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Appendix
The coefficients of the value function in Theorem 1 are given by
b(t) = −η 1
T − t ,
c(t) =
T
T − th
−1(0, t)
∫ T
t
β(u)
T − u
T
h(0, u)du,
dhom(t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
2β(u)du
)
d(t) = dhom(t)
∫ T
t
c2(u)
4ηdhom(u)
du
e(t) =
T
T − t
∫ T
t
(c(u) + 1)α(u)
T − u
T
du,
fhom(t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
β(u)du
)
f(t) = fhom(t)
∫ T
t
(
1
2η
c(u)e(u) + 2α(u)d(u)
)
1
fhom(u)
du
g(t) =
∫ T
t
(
e2(u)
4η
+ α(u)f + σ2d(u)
)
du,
with t ∈ [0, T ]. We remark that Theorem 1 can be derived from Theorem 2
in [15]. The proof given below is completely different though, using classical
verification arguments.
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Proof (Proof of Theorem 1) Let w(t, x, s) = b(t)x2 + c(t)xs+ d(t)s2 + e(t)x+
f(t)s+g(t). We first show that the value function satisfies V ≤ w. Notice that
w is a solution of the HJB Equation (4) and satisfies the terminal condition
(5). This follows from the fact that the coefficients satisfy the following ODEs
−bt − 1
η
b2 = 0
−ct − 1
η
bc− βc− β = 0
−dt − 1
4η
c2 − 2βd = 0
−et − 1
η
be− αc− α = 0
−ft − 1
2η
ce− 2αd− βf = 0
−gt − 1
4η
e2 − αf − σ2d = 0.
Since the functions α and β are bounded, there exists a constant C ∈ R+ such
that
|c(t)|+ |d(t)|+ |e(t)|+ |f(t)|+ |g(t)| ≤ C(T − t) (20)
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, we have |b(t)| ≤ C 1T−t .
Let ξ ∈ A(t, x) be an arbitrary admissible control and let X be its associ-
ated position process. Let τ < T . Itoˆ’s formula implies
w(τ,Xτ , Sτ ) = w(t, x, s) +
∫ τ
t
1
2
σ2wss(u,Xu, Su)du+Mτ
+
∫ τ
t
[wt(u,Xu, Su)− wx(u,Xu, Su)ξu + a(u, Su)ws(u,Xu, Su)]du,
where Ms =
∫ s
t
ws(u,Xu, Su)σdWu. As (Xt)t∈[0,τ ] is L2-bounded and all func-
tions b, c, d, e, f, g and their derivatives are bounded on [t, τ ], M is a strict
martingale on [t, τ ]. Taking expectations, therefore, leads to
E(w(τ,Xτ , Sτ )) = w(t, x, s) + E
(∫ τ
t
(
wt − wxξ + aws + 1
2
σ2wss
)
(u,Xu, Su)du
)
≤ w(t, x, s) + E
(∫ τ
t
(−a(u, Su)Xu + ηξ2u)du
)
. (21)
As ξ is square integrable (Condition (A1)). This further implies that we have
lim
τ→T
E
(∫ τ
t
(−a(u, Su)Xu + ηξ2u)du
)
= J(t, x, s, ξ).
Moreover, since also
(
X2t
T−t
)
t∈[0,T )
is uniformly integrable and limt→T
X2t
T−t =
0, we have limτ→T E[w(τ,Xτ , Sτ )] = 0. Inequality (21), therefore, implies
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w(t, x, s) ≥ J(t, x, s, ξ). Taking the supremum over all admissible controls, one
has V (t, x, s) ≤ w(t, x, s).
Secondly, we show that the control (ξ∗t )t∈[0,T ] is admissible. Using the ma-
joration (20) on the coefficients c, b and e, one can show that there exists a
constant C such that
|[c(u)Su + e(u)]| T
(T − u) ≤ C(|Su|+ 1)
for all u ∈ [0, T ]. With (8) we obtain that |X∗t | ≤ C(T − t)(1 +
∫ t
0
|Su| du) and
hence Condition (A2) is satisfied.
Condition (A1) is a consequence of ξ2t ≤ C(b(t)2X2t + b(t)Xt) ≤ C.
Equality holds in Inequality (21) by choosing ξ = ξ∗. This proves that J(t, x, s, ξ∗) =
w(t, s, x). Thus the proof is complete.
